The Failed Cowboy Who Became a Precursor to Fascism
Part Three of Three
On June 23, 1892, two men met on the Île de la Grande Jatte, outside Paris, to settle a dispute with swords. One was Captain Armand Mayer, an officer and inspector of studies at the École Polytechnique. The other was the Marquis de Morès, the French aristocrat who had spent several years attempting to establish a meatpacking empire in the Dakota Badlands.
Mayer was Jewish. During the preceding weeks, the antisemitic newspaper La Libre Parole had questioned the loyalty of Jewish officers serving in the French army. Mayer became involved after another officer challenged that campaign. Morès, who supported the attacks, then challenged Mayer himself over the disclosure of the record of an earlier duel. The dispute had grown out of a campaign that treated Jewish ancestry as grounds for questioning a soldier’s loyalty to France.
The duel ended almost immediately. Morès’s sword struck Mayer below the right arm. The wounded captain died within hours. Morès was arrested and, after a trial that August, acquitted. The encounter had grown out of a newspaper campaign, and now a French officer was dead.
Nine years earlier, Morès had arrived in Dakota Territory with a very different ambition. He wanted to use refrigerated railcars to bypass Chicago’s meatpackers and supply the eastern United States with beef from the northern plains. That venture failed, and a second commercial scheme in Asia ended much the same way. His subsequent turn toward antisemitic politics drew on prejudices he had encountered long before either failure, as well as the organized political movement he found waiting for him in France.
A Second Gamble, This Time in Asia
By the end of 1886, the packing plant at Medora had closed, and Morès’s attempts to reorganize his meat business were deteriorating. His plans for retail shops in New York continued into 1887, but partnerships collapsed, creditors pressed their claims, and his access to family money was no longer assured. He had once imagined that control over slaughtering, refrigeration, transportation, and retailing would give him a place in a rapidly changing industry. Instead, he left a town struggling to survive without the enterprise that had employed many of its residents.
Morès continued looking for a large venture that might restore his fortunes. Later in 1887 he and his wife, Medora, traveled to India, where they took part in extravagant hunting excursions. Before long he became interested in railway construction in French Indochina.
The proposal was to link Tonkin, in what is now northern Vietnam, more effectively with the Chinese frontier and the coast. Morès imagined a railway, a port, land concessions, and eventually a commercial settlement. The resemblance to his Dakota experiment was unmistakable. In both places, he saw transportation infrastructure as an opportunity to reorganize economic activity and create a new center of trade.
The French colonial administration was already interested in stronger commercial and military connections through Tonkin, although the territory remained contested and the cost of extending French power was considerable. During 1888 and early 1889 Morès examined routes and negotiated with officials. Governor-General Étienne Richaud was receptive enough to refer aspects of the plan for technical examination. Questions remained about the proposed route, the land Morès requested, financing, and the concessions he expected a colonial administration to grant him.
The railway was also part of France’s expanding colonial ambitions. Morès and sympathetic administrators envisioned roads, railways, and new settlements strengthening French control of the region. Their plans treated the land and labor of people already living there as resources to be incorporated into the colonial economy, with little indication that those communities had a meaningful say in the negotiations.
The venture never advanced into construction. Richaud’s position weakened as Ernest Constans, a former governor-general of Indochina, regained influence in Paris and became interior minister in February 1889. Richaud was recalled, depriving Morès of a receptive official. The project still faced unresolved technical and financial problems, and the preliminary interest shown by colonial administrators had never amounted to a government commitment to build the railway.
He returned to France convinced that powerful interests had obstructed him. His earlier defeats in America and his frustration with colonial officials became part of the story he told about his own life. Yet the political movement he entered was already waiting for someone with his appetite for publicity and confrontation.
A Divided Republic
France in 1889 was still living with the consequences of the Franco-Prussian War. Defeat in 1870–71 had helped bring down Napoleon III, cost France Alsace-Lorraine, and left deep arguments over the country’s military strength and national identity. The Third Republic survived, but its supporters were challenged by monarchists, conservative Catholics, nationalists, and movements that promised to sweep away parliamentary corruption.
Economic grievances added to the unrest. Workers protested wages and conditions, farmers and small traders complained about competition and middlemen, and critics of industrial capitalism worried about the concentration of financial power. Different political movements offered competing explanations for these problems.
Antisemitic activists supplied one particularly destructive explanation. They portrayed Jews collectively as agents of financial manipulation, political corruption, and national weakness. Their accusations revived older religious prejudices while recasting them as arguments about nationality, race, economic power, and the survival of France.
Édouard Drumont was among the most effective propagandists. His two-volume La France juive, published in 1886, turned a sprawling collection of accusations into a highly publicized attack on French Jews. By the time Morès returned from Asia, Drumont already had an audience and an organized campaign. Public figures willing to bring its message into meetings and onto the streets could help it grow.
Morès met Drumont in the autumn of 1889. Drumont had a readership and a talent for polemic. Morès brought an aristocratic title, military credentials, notoriety from his American adventures, and a willingness to make political conflict personal. Together, they helped carry antisemitic agitation into public meetings, electoral campaigns, and increasingly confrontational street politics.
Morès had been educated in a conservative Catholic milieu in which anti-Jewish attitudes already circulated. His business failures supplied new grievances, and Drumont’s movement offered him a way to direct them toward an imagined Jewish enemy. By the end of 1889, he had chosen to make that cause central to his political ambitions.
An Aristocrat Speaking for Workers
Morès claimed to speak for workers, small producers, and consumers against powerful financial and commercial interests. During his American career, he had promised to shorten the journey from ranch to dinner table by eliminating middlemen. In France he used similar language when discussing credit, distribution, and the relationship between capital and labor.
He advocated cooperation among occupational groups and criticized economic competition that he believed weakened France. Catholic reformers, cooperative movements, and other critics of liberal capitalism were also debating how workers and employers might organize economic life. Morès took those arguments in an antisemitic direction, tying economic reform to a vision of the nation that excluded Jews.
He blamed Jewish financiers and traders for hardships facing ordinary French people. His speeches offered workers and conservative property owners a common target for their frustrations, while allowing him to present himself as an ally of labor without challenging his own privileged position. The solidarity he promised depended on treating Jewish citizens as outsiders.
In April 1890 he stood for election to the Paris Municipal Council in the working-class Épinettes district and lost. He continued organizing meetings and recruiting supporters. During preparations for the first international May Day demonstrations, police grew concerned about his attempts to redirect workers’ activism into antisemitic agitation. Morès was arrested and ultimately served about two months in Sainte-Pélagie prison after receiving a three-month sentence.
After his release, Morès continued the campaign. By 1892, his supporters included butchers and slaughterhouse workers in the La Villette district of Paris, men working in the same industry he had once tried to reorganize in America. They faced concerns about markets, imports, and livelihoods. Morès encouraged them to blame Jewish merchants and businessmen for those pressures.
Some of his followers controlled access to meetings and intimidated opponents. Newspapers and public demonstrations spread the message, while threats and violence helped silence challenges to it. The campaign brought questions of wages and commerce together with attacks on the right of Jewish citizens to belong in French public life.
The Sword and the French Army
In May 1892, La Libre Parole began attacking Jewish officers serving in the French military, questioning their patriotism on the basis of religion and ancestry. The army occupied a central place in French public life after the defeat of 1870–71, making attacks on the loyalty of serving officers especially inflammatory.
Captain André Crémieu-Foa challenged the campaign, and a succession of duels followed. Morès became involved in the controversy. Captain Armand Mayer had acted as a second in an earlier encounter, and Morès held him responsible when a record of that duel became public.
Historians Philippe-E. Landau and Philippe Oriol argue that Mayer had no responsibility for the disclosure. Whatever the immediate quarrel over the published record, Morès’s challenge took place amid a campaign pressing Jewish officers to defend their honor against public accusations of disloyalty.
Mayer was an accomplished officer who had attended the École Polytechnique and the École de guerre before returning to the former institution as an inspector of studies. He had considerably less experience with the sword than Morès, and his right arm had been troubling him shortly before the duel.
On June 23, 1892, they met on the Île de la Grande Jatte. In the first exchange, Morès’s sword struck Mayer below the right arm, inflicting a wound from which he died within hours.
The killing attracted attention beyond France. An antisemitic press campaign had helped produce a confrontation in which a serving French officer lost his life. Morès was arrested and tried, but on August 30, 1892, a jury acquitted him. His admirers celebrated the verdict and praised his willingness to carry political quarrels into personal violence.
Two years later, Alfred Dreyfus would be arrested on charges of treason. The campaign against Mayer and other Jewish officers had already shown how readily ancestry could be used to cast suspicion on military service. The Dreyfus Affair would expose that prejudice on a much larger scale.
An Embarrassing Financial Secret
Morès remained prominent in extremist circles after the Mayer affair, but the financial contradictions in his public life were catching up with him. He denounced Jewish money and alleged that financiers exercised illegitimate power over the nation. Meanwhile, he continued to depend on credit, patrons, and family assistance.
In July 1893, his financial affairs came under formal family supervision. Future transactions required authorization. The measure reflected the family’s growing alarm over the scale and persistence of his debts.
A further humiliation followed in August. While Morès was testifying in litigation connected with forged political documents, he attacked Georges Clemenceau over his relationship with Cornélius Herz, a Jewish financier implicated in controversies surrounding the Panama scandal. Clemenceau replied that Morès had himself obtained a loan from Herz.
Morès had made Jewish financial influence a frequent target of his public speeches. Clemenceau’s reply revealed that Morès himself had borrowed 20,000 francs from Herz in 1891, when other sources of credit were closed to him. He tried to explain the circumstances, but the disclosure damaged his credibility among supporters whom he had encouraged to suspect such relationships. Morès continued promoting antisemitic politics, now with an embarrassing contradiction for his opponents to exploit.
From Paris to the Sahara
The Herz revelation had damaged Morès’s political standing, while his family was already struggling to bring his debts under control. Yet his appetite for ambitious undertakings remained. Having tried to establish a beef empire in Dakota and a railway in Indochina, he began looking toward North Africa.
France had ruled Algeria for decades and established a protectorate over Tunisia, while its ambitions farther into the Sahara depended on negotiations with local leaders and control over difficult routes. Communities across the region had their own authorities, alliances, and disputes. Any expedition would require reliable guides, escorts, supplies, and agreements for safe passage.
Morès hoped to build French influence through relationships with Muslim leaders. He also regarded Britain as an imperial rival and increasingly imagined British ambitions and Jewish interests working together in a conspiracy against France. That imagined alliance became part of the way he interpreted events around him.
In 1896, after extended preparations and earlier reconnaissance, he led a caravan into the Sahara. As the expedition continued, relations with guides and local groups became increasingly uncertain. Morès sensed danger but pressed on. Near the oasis of El Ouatia, his party was attacked. On June 9, 1896, the Marquis de Morès was killed, several days before his thirty-eighth birthday.
His supporters soon portrayed him as a patriotic martyr, alleging without evidence that Jewish enemies had arranged his death. The attack occurred amid a hazardous expedition and increasingly troubled relationships with local groups; its precise motives remained disputed.
Morès had lost his Dakota business, failed to secure his Asian railway, and suffered public humiliation over his finances before dying on another ambitious expedition. His admirers recast these defeats as the struggles of a patriotic man thwarted by powerful enemies. The circumstances of his death made that account easier to promote.
Was He the First Fascist?
Sergio Luzzatto titled his 2026 biography The First Fascist. Morès died in 1896, decades before Mussolini’s movement emerged from the political crises following the First World War. The title points to features of Morès’s political career that would become familiar in later fascist movements.
Morès combined militant nationalism with the identification of an internal enemy, attacked parliamentary institutions, tried to unite workers and conservatives in a common movement, and used intimidation and personal violence. Some of his economic proposals resembled later corporatist programs, a tradition that also had advocates well outside fascist politics.
In a text from 1894, Morès invoked the ancient Roman fasces, a bundle of rods associated with political authority and collective strength. The same symbol later supplied fascism with its name, although it had appeared in republican and revolutionary traditions long before Mussolini adopted it. Its appearance in Morès’s writing tells us something about his political imagery; the broader argument rests on his methods and ideas.
Historians and critics have been debating how to describe Morès for decades. In 1950, Robert F. Byrnes examined his combination of nationalism, social appeals, and antisemitism in an article calling him the first national socialist. More recently, Mark Lilla has considered the term protofascist while questioning the value of naming Morès the first fascist. Erik Linstrum likewise cautions against carrying a twentieth-century category too neatly back into the nineteenth.
The fascist movements of the twentieth century emerged amid mass mobilization and crises that Morès never experienced, and they created institutions he could not have anticipated. Antisemitism was central to his program, while its role varied among the movements later classified as fascist.
Calling Morès a precursor captures the resemblance while keeping him in his own historical setting. He brought popular economic complaints together with an exclusionary nationalism and a willingness to threaten or attack opponents. Those methods would be recognizable to observers of European politics several decades later.
Why Vichy Remembered Him
During the Second World War, Morès’s name acquired renewed political value. The French state based in Vichy collaborated with Nazi Germany and enacted policies that excluded, dispossessed, arrested, and helped deport Jews. Officials carrying out those policies celebrated figures from France’s earlier antisemitic movements.
On May 11, 1942, Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, recently appointed head of the Commissariat-General for Jewish Questions, praised earlier French antisemites in an interview with Paris-Soir. He singled out Morès for the activism that had accompanied his writings. Darquier was presenting Vichy’s persecution as the continuation of a French political tradition with roots in the previous century.
Then, on July 27, 1942, the municipal authorities of Cannes, operating under the Vichy regime, formally named a public garden after Morès. The city had acquired the property that spring. The resolution celebrated his fighting spirit and explicitly included his opposition to Jews among his merits.
Only eleven days before the Cannes resolution, French police had begun the Vélodrome d’Hiver roundup in Paris, arresting thousands of Jews, including children, on July 16 and 17. The operation formed part of the deportations carried out under German occupation with French collaboration. When Cannes honored Morès, the regime was already arresting Jewish families on a massive scale.
Darquier’s interview and the Cannes resolution reveal the kind of political ancestor Vichy officials wanted to claim: an outspoken antisemite who organized followers, threatened opponents, and made violence part of public political life.
The Rest of the Story
Morès is still easier to encounter in North Dakota than in France. Medora bears his wife’s name, the Château de Morès preserves the setting of their Dakota years, and the remains of the old packing operation recall his ambitious attempt to change the meat trade. The enterprise employed local workers, attracted families, and helped establish a town that outlived the business itself.
His years in France and North Africa complete that history. He promoted antisemitic conspiracy theories, helped organize public intimidation, took part in violent political confrontations, and eventually became a celebrated figure among men carrying out far more extensive persecution. The State Historical Society of North Dakota has begun addressing his antisemitism in its interpretation of the Château de Morès historic site.
Morès arrived in Dakota intending to change the way Americans bought beef. His venture left behind Medora, a town that survived the failure of his business. His later political career brought him admiration from antisemitic agitators, and decades after his death, officials taking part in the persecution of Jews publicly claimed him as one of their predecessors.
Sources
Sergio Luzzatto, The First Fascist: The Sensational Life and Dark Legacy of the Marquis de Morès (Harvard University Press, 2026), prologue and chapters 7–20.
Philippe-E. Landau and Philippe Oriol, “Capitaine Armand Mayer,” Dictionnaire de l’affaire Dreyfus, June 29, 2022.
“The French Have Been a Little Shocked by the Result,” The Spectator, July 2, 1892, p. 11.
“The French Dueling Case,” Evening Star (New Zealand), December 3, 1892.
Mark Lilla, “Clown Show,” The New York Review of Books, March 26, 2026.
Erik Linstrum, “Was a French Aristocrat the First Fascist?” The New Republic, 2026.
Robert F. Byrnes, “Morès, ‘The First National Socialist’,” The Review of Politics (1950).
State Historical Society of North Dakota, “Dealing with the Marquis de Mores’ Anti-Semitism at the Chateau de Mores State Historic Site.”